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Subjecting Dasein 
La delle Me Whorter 
"Das 'Subjekt' ist eine Fiktion," Nietzsche declares in aphorism 370 
of Der Wille zur Macht. There is no such thing as an ego, a unitary 
center of personhood that can be appraised and approved for its virtue 
and wisdom or blamed for its premeditated transgressions and irre-
sponsible beliefs. Subjectivity does not exist. Despite Nietzsche's per-
vasive influence, however, the question of subjectivity-the onrologi-
cal nature, the ethical status, and the epistemological significance of 
the human subject-has been a preeminent theme in Continental phi-
losophy for the entirety of the twentieth century. Virtually all Conti-
nental philosophers have found it necessary to address the question. 
Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault are not exceptional in that re-
gard. Both thinkers take up the question as a central issue in their 
work; both have a great deal to say about subjectivity and its philo-
sophical place. 
On the face of it, however, the two men's conceptions of subjectivi-
ty seem quite divergent, particularly when one looks at the earlier work 
of Heidegger alongside the later work of Foucault. In Sein und Zeit, 
Heidegger undertakes an analytic of Dasein, a systematic phenomeno-
logical investigation of individual human existence, while Foucault (in 
texts such as Surveiller et punir, for example) eschews any such over-
arching ontological project and pluralizes subjectivity to speak of his-
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torically emergent subjectivities. (And some would say, as a follower of 
Nietzsche, he goes so far as to debunk and dismantle subjectivity al-
together.) If one reads Heidegger as an existentialist through the French 
existential movement and Foucault as a Nietzschean iconoclast (es-
pecially through North American leftist and feminist commentators), 
there seems to be no ground of comparison. Heidegger, it would seem, 
believes in the phenomenological and epistemological primacy of the 
human subject, while Foucault apparently believes that there is no such 
thing as the subject at all. 
To compare Heidegger's and Foucault's understandings of subjec-
tivity, to stage a critical encounter between them on this issue, the first 
thing that must be done is to put these two philosophers onto some 
common ground. We can do that by developing a reading of Foucault 
that dispels the widely held idea that he repudiates the notion of sub-
jectivity in toto and a reading of Heidegger that does not take the ana-
lytic of Dasein to be ahistorical. Only then can we usefully compare 
the two ways of thinking and see how they contrast and what differ-
ing effects they might have. 
I will begin, then, with Foucault. In the first section of this chapter 
I will discuss the ubiquitous claim that Foucault repudiates subjectivi-
ty as an analytic category and an ontological reality and will put forth 
an alternative interpretation of his work. In the second section I will 
discuss the view-put forward by Kevin Hill, for one-that Foucault's 
account of subjectivity is a direct reaction against Heidegger's work. 
Then I will begin to develop a reading of Heidegger that distinguishes 
between Dasein on the one hand and subjectivity on the other and that 
takes very seriously the import of temporality in Dasein's constitution-
my aim here being to bring out a Heideggerian account of Dasein that 
is historical in some of the ways that Foucault's pluralized subjectivi-
ties are historical. In this section I will move toward a way of reading 
subjectivity in Heidegger's work that focuses on the effects of his dis-
cursive practice more than on the assertions that he makes. It is on 
this ground, I believe-the shifting and perhaps ungrounding ground 
of discursive effects-that convergence between the two philosophers 
can usefully and fruitfully occur. In the final section of the chapter, then, 
I will stage this convergence by turning to the issue of care, a major 
theme in both thinkers' writings. I will argue that under the theme of 
care Heidegger's work moves thinking along some of the same paths 
that Foucault's work tends to move. Differently put, I will argue that 
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both thinkers engage in philosophical practices of care that create some 
similar philosophical effects, that transform the thinking that goes on 
in, as, and alongside their texts. I will argue that both are caught up in 
practices of philosophical self-overcoming that move them and their 
readers beyond such notions as subjectivity as traditionally conceived. 
Although their differences are great, I hope to show that the conse-
quences of following their very different paths are in some ways re-
markably similar. 
The Subject for Foucault 
In an interview from the mid-r970S, Foucault discusses his interest in 
coming to an understanding of the historical emergence of certain cate-
gories of human being-such as the madman or the criminal. The em-
phasis in his discussion, as in his analyses, is not on subjectivity "it-
self," but rather on history, on emergence and passage; he wants to 
understand how forms of subjectivities that have not previously exist-
ed have come into existence (and how some have passed away). It is in 
that context that he says: 
I don't believe the problem can be solved by historicising the subject 
as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a subject that 
evolves through the course of history. One has to dispense with the 
constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to ar-
rive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of knowl-
edges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make 
reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the 
field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course 
of history.t 
It is this passage, above a!J,2 that has led so many readers to conclude 
that Foucault takes Nietzsche literally and maintains that there is no 
such thing as subjectivity.3 But it is important to note that here, as 
elsewhere, Foucault is actually making a much more nuanced and 
strategic (as opposed to ontological) claim. He is actually saying that 
to understand the emergence of certain forms of subjectivity in his-
tory, we have to refrain from presuming that any aspect of subjectivity 
stands apart from history and preexists its historical "expression" or 
formation. History-or more precisely historical forces, networks of 
power relations-must receive complete analytic priority over subjec-
tivity if we are to take the historical emergence of subjectivities like 
the delinquent or the madman seriously. Therefore, Foucault's ana-
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lytic demotion of subjectivity, far from being the prelude to dismissing 
subjectivity altogether, is a way of coming to terms with the reality of 
subjectivities as they actually occur and as we experience them. Sub-
jectivity is not dismissed at all; it takes on central importance as the 
very reason for Foucault's repudiation of ahistorical categories. As he 
asserts in a r983 interview, "[I]t is not power, but the subject, which is 
the general theme of my research. "4 
Nevertheless, many commentators still object that Foucault is ef-
fectively eliminating subjectivity not only as a historical constant, but 
as the individual human agent. For, if there is no center of identity or 
selfhood that persists regardless of historical change, there is no agent 
who can initiate thought and action; what appears as subjectivity is in 
reality just an effect of historical, social, and political forces and so (as 
is often concluded) cannot ever act freely, independent of such forces. 
Linda Alcoff writes, 
[I]t is not simply the transcendental notion of subjectivity that 
Foucault is opposing, that is, a subject that is transhistorical and uni-
versal, but the notion of a subject as a being with a kind of primor-
dial interiority that is autonomous or spontaneous in some ontologi-
cal sense. This is why Foucault says that historicizing the subject is 
insufficient and that we must dispense with the constituent subject 
altogether .... What his analysis undermines is the conceptualization 
of the very internal life of consciousness that has been taken, within 
the Cartesian tradition, to be the ultimate authority, a level of reality 
about which we can have more direct knowledge than any other and 
that generates a knowledge least open to interpretation and illusion.5 
Not only is Foucault opposing a perhaps questionable philosophical 
formulation of transcendental subjectivity-a Kantian or Husserlian 
transcendental ego-but, according to Alcoff, he is also opposing the 
more usual, commonsense notion of subjectivity as my own inner life, 
my own sense of myself persisting through time, my own conscious-
ness as distinct from the various experiences that I undergo, and my 
ability to originate action. 
It is this last issue that most distresses Alcoff and many other femi-
nist and leftist commentators.6 If we adopt Foucault's analysis of sub-
jectivity as a pluralized, historically emergent effect of networks of 
power, we allegedly lose any claim to freedom or responsibility-in 
short, we lose agency. As I have argued elsewhere/ I believe this under-
standing and consequent criticisms of Foucault result from a tendency 
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to read passages such as the one quoted above about the role of the 
concept of subjectivity in various philosophical projects alongside other 
passages where Foucault is concerned with subjectivities as effects of 
power. In particular, Alcoff cites an interview from 1983 where Fou-
cault says, "It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. 
There are two meanings of the word subject: subject to someone else 
by control and dependence, and tied to [one's] own identity by a con-
science or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power 
which subjugates and makes subject to." 8 
Surely the two definitions of the word subject that Foucault offers 
here are uncontroversial. And, while subjection of the first sort does 
compromise agency, subjection of the second sort is the very basis for 
agency; without conscience or self-knowledge surely responsible deci-
sion and action could not occur. What troubles Alcoff and others is 
the last sentence, wherein Foucault suggests that conscience and self-
knowledge are effects of subjugation. If it is the case that power is the 
source of conscience and self-knowledge, then it would appear that in-
dividual selves have no control over their own beliefs and hence their 
own actions; agency is an illusion. 
This conclusion can be avoided, however, if we take very seriously 
Foucault's account of power. Foucault insists that there is no such thing 
as power, no entity that stands apart from and causes "its" effects.9 
Power is an event, not a thing. It is not a cause that generates effects 
external to it. It exists only in its exercise, its occurrence, and it occurs 
as sets of relations. Within these relations of repeating events, selves 
(among other beings) form. Selves are events of power and remain al-
ways dependent upon repetitions of the power-events that maintain 
them. Consciences, self-understandings, capacities for judgment and 
creative practice come to be within these networks of repeating events. 
Subjugation occurs and subjects emerge, but the power relations that 
afford these emergences are not therefore external to them. Selves are 
not constrained by powers external and foreign to them. Relations and 
networks of power are selves, are subjects.10 
The reason many commentators are troubled by Foucault's insis-
tence on seeing subjectivities as "effects" of power is that they fail to 
revise their conception of power along Foucauldian lines. They persist 
in understanding power as an entity external to the entities it pro-
duces. Therefore they tend to view power as a kind of agent itself, the 
real agent of historical events, one that robs human individuals of their 
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freedom by controlling their behavior and beliefs. In other words, they 
fail to make the analytic reassignment that Foucault insists upon; they 
fail to understand subjectivity as historical and then accuse Foucault 
of simply eliminating human subjectivity while promoting the subjec-
tivity of power. 
For Foucault the genealogist, all subjectivity is historically emer-
gent. He writes, "Where the soul pretends unification or the self 
fabricates a coherent identity, the genealogist sets out to study the 
beginning-numberless beginnings whose faint traces and hints of 
color are readily seen by an historical eye. The analysis of descent per-
mits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as 
an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events. "11 This 
means, of course, that all subjectivity occurs in and as relations of 
power. But this does not mean that agency is illusory or that individu-
al selves cannot take responsibility, create new things, or deliberately 
undertake to change themselves and the world around them. The 
question for Foucault, then, is: How do such beings with these capaci-
ties and others come into existence? How have these beings been ef-
fected and how do they effect changes in themselves and others? What 
relations exist between these beings and the systems of knowledge 
that they produce and that produce them? 12 These questions are thor-
oughly historical even while they are also thoroughly philosophical. 
But because subjectivities are historical, because capacities and self-
knowledges differ across different subjectivities, the philosophical ques-
tions cannot be addressed outside specified historical contexts. How 
madmen came to exist and engage in practices of self-transformation 
is a different question from how homosexuals came to exist and en-
gage in practices of self-transformation. There is no answer to the 
question of how subjectivity comes to exist for the simple reason that 
there is no such thing as subjectivity per se. There are only madmen 
and women, delinquents, homosexuals, citizens, Christians, and so on. 
But these subjectivities assuredly do exist-or at least have existed-
and they can be objects of historico-philosophical (or, in other words, 
genealogical) investigation. 
The Subject for Heidegger 
All of this would seem to make Foucault's work incompatible with 
Heidegger's work in Being and Time. Indeed, Kevin R. Hill has argued 
that "[t]hroughout Foucault's early 'archeological' works, Being and 
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Time occupies a central position as an object of criticism."13 In par-
ticular, Hill argues, Foucault is critical of Heidegger's attempt 
to move beyond the everyday to an interpretation of what Dasein 
really is (even while Dasein attempts to flee this knowledge), i.e., 
being-toward-death. This core of our being is intended as an ahistori-
cal feature of Dasein which must enter into any of its comportments 
whatsoever-indeed, it is meant to be the transcendental condition 
for human existence. (335) 
If Hill's assessment of Heidegger's project in Being and Time is cor-
rect, Foucault's abandonment of transcendental explanation and his 
complete historicization of human subjectivity is utterly irreconcilable 
with Heidegger's work-whether or not Foucault deliberately criti-
cizes Being and Time. 
Hill goes on to discuss Foucault's Birth of the Clinic, claiming that 
"[a]ccording to Foucault, prior to the nineteenth century, the concept 
of death was radically excluded from the concepts of life and nature as 
a kind of counter-force, and this conceptual structure made medical 
pathology an unintelligible enterprise" (335). In other words, Hill 
maintains, human experience of death has varied through history, so 
in Foucault's view it cannot serve as a constitutive feature of human 
existence transcendent to history. 
Indeed, to this extent at least, Hill is undeniably correct. Foucault 
does claim in The Birth of the Clinic that death is completely reconfig-
ured and realigned in medical discourses at the end of the eighteenth 
century, 14 and he goes on to claim that this change in the meaning of 
death is what gives us moderns our understanding of ourselves.15 He 
reasserts this same claim in The Order of Things when he argues that 
the modern episteme, which is now in the process of crumbling, is 
rooted in death: "Is death not that upon the basis of which knowledge 
in general is possible?"16 Death, as we understand it and as it fig-
ures into our knowledges and practices, is therefore a modern phe-
nomenon, not a transhistorical one. Furthermore, Hill continues, the 
analytic of finitude that Foucault criticizes in The Order of Things 
"begins with Kant [and] reaches ... its consummate expression in 
Heidegger's Being and Time" (337). Thus Foucault's announcement of 
the death of man is, in effect, also an announcement of the death of the 
kind of philosophical project that Being and Time represents. 
While Hill's points are important, and he may well be right that 
one of Foucault's major targets in some of his work-particularly in 
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The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things-is the existentialist 
thought that Heidegger's early writings helped to initiate, the charac-
terization of Heidegger's analytic of Dasein that Hill puts forth is not 
the only possible interpretation of Heidegger's work, and in fact is not 
the best interpretation. Far from seeking a transcendental structure or 
foundation for human being-which is, of course, what Foucault's 
historicization of subjectivity precludes-Heidegger is seeking a way 
to think about human existence that does not turn human being into a 
being-present. An ahistorical characteristic is an ever-present charac-
teristic; it is something that defies temporality or at least that main-
tains itself in one mode of temporality. Insofar as human being, or 
subjectivity, has been thought that way, Heidegger's work is destruc-
tive of itY Even prior to Being and Time, for example in his lecture 
course from the summer of 1923, Heidegger insists, "Dasein is not a 
'thing' like a piece of wood nor such a thing as a plant-nor does it 
consist of experiences, and still less is it a subject (an ego) standing 
over against objects (which are not the ego)." 18 The term Dasein and 
the use made of the term Dasein are intended to move our thought 
away from the tradition that seeks transcendental structures. Heideg-
ger writes: 
In choosing a term to designate this region of being and appropriate-
ly demarcate it, we have avoided the expression "human Dasein" 
[human existence], "human being," and will continue to do so. In all 
its traditional categorial forms, the concept of man fundamentally 
obstructs what we are supposed to bring into view as facticity. The 
question "What is man?" blocks its own view of what it is really 
after with an object foreign to it. (Ontology, 21) 
And we do not see a departure from this position in Being and Time. 
Heidegger is adamant from the beginning of his analytic of Dasein 
that "[t]his being ... never has the kind of being of what is merely ob-
jectively present within the world." 19 Just as Foucault announces his 
opposition to the phenomenological methods that posit an ahistorical 
subject, Heidegger announces his opposition to the medieval and mod-
ern philosophical thinking that substantializes human existence. He 
opens Being and Time with declarations such as this: 
One of our first tasks will be to show that the point of departure from 
an initially given ego and subject totally fails to see the phenomenal 
content of Da-sein. Every idea of a "subject" ... still posits the sub-
jectum (hupokeimenon) ontologically along with it, no matter how 
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energetic one's ontic protestations against the "substantial soul" or 
the "reification of consciousness." (B&T, 43) 
For Heidegger, as for Foucault, subjectivity is never treated as a sub-
stance, a foundation, or an origin, even when it is treated as a central 
philosophical issue. Hill may want to argue, as does Michel Haar,20 
that Heidegger fails to think Dasein without surreptitiously positing 
an ahistorical transcendental feature of human existence, and thus he 
might argue that Heidegger's work differs from Foucault's in its de-
gree of success; but in aim there is more similarity than difference. 
Both thinkers are attempting to move away from traditional concep-
tions of subjectivity and into a way of thinking that disciplines itself to 
history rather than to transcendental truth. 
Furthermore, deathliness is not an ever-present transcendental 
condition for the possibility of Dasein, as Hill apparently would have 
it. Dasein's deathliness is its possibility for absence, discontinuity, ces-
sation, passage. Dasein's deathliness is its being in history, its lack of 
eternality or rest in the self-same. Thinking Dasein's deathliness is 
thinking its nontranscendentality. Heidegger moreover does not posit 
a consciousness of deathliness as a necessary feature or characteristic 
of Dasein; Dasein is not given to itself as a subject who has deathliness 
ever before it as an object. Dasein just is deathly and ex-ists in that 
way of being. Awareness of deathliness also occurs, of course; even 
consciousness of deathliness may occur. But consciousness of deathli-
ness or limit or loss is not what makes Dasein Dasein. In no way, 
therefore, is deathliness an essentially present thing either in Dasein's 
being or in Dasein's thinking. Dasein is as a being who may not be. 
It is certainly a mistake to read Heidegger's analytic of Dasein as 
an analysis of human subjectivity squarely within the tradition of 
Descartes and Kant. Heidegger's work is not an extension of that tra-
dition; it is a break from that tradition and a critique of it. Never-
theless, Heidegger was never able to finish the analysis he began in 
Being and Time. Despite his intention to work against the metaphysics 
of presence and to think Dasein against the long reign of substan-
tial subjectivity, he could not fulfill his aim. Otto Poggeler, among oth-
ers, claims that the work was bound to fail, "because its point of de-
parture carried within it the necessity of failure. "21 Despite himself, 
Poggeler argues, Heidegger was too foundationalist in orientation, 
too intent upon wanting-to-ground. He starts with Dasein in an effort 
to secure or found his investigation into the question of being. Dasein's 
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role in Being and Time is to stabilize the Seinsfrage, which means 
Dasein's non-self-identity is perpetually at odds with its function as 
analytic, phenomenological origin. Poggeler writes, "Only slowly did 
Heidegger's thinking relinquish its wanting-to-ground. Experiencing 
the thrownness of the grounding projection had to be deepened to 
experiencing the abysmal character of the truth of Being" (130). The 
problem, according to Poggeler, lay primarily in Heidegger's use of 
metaphysical language to undo metaphysical, or representational think-
ing. As he struggled with the questions his own work was raising, 
however, Heidegger's language gradually transformed, which made it 
possible for him to move beyond the quasi-foundationalist tendencies 
of the analytic of Dasein. 
Nonetheless, Poggeler emphasizes that Heidegger's early work, for 
all its flaws, does not come to an end in anticipation of the later work; 
there are not two Heideggers. Being and Time fails only on its own 
most literal terms. Much more importantly, it also succeeds. Its suc-
cess lies in the fact that it serves as a pathway for Heidegger and for 
Heidegger's readers through a set of fundamental questions toward 
a different way of conceiving of those questions in particular and of 
philosophical practice in general. If we read Heidegger's work as a 
pathway, as Poggeler suggests, rather than as a set of assertions and 
arguments, we will experience it in its eventful occurrence as an un-
folding. It is this way of reading, I will argue in the next section, that 
allows Heidegger's work to move with or at least close to Foucault's. 
Care 
For Heidegger in Being and Time, Dasein is care.22 Ontically this means 
that Dasein watches over, protects, repairs, and in general takes care of 
things and is concerned with and about others and self. All this is be-
cause things can decay and break and people can be injured or die. Care 
bespeaks an alertness to passage and deathliness. But this way of con-
struing care does not constitute an adequate understanding of Heideg-
ger's ontological claim that the being of Dasein is care. Fundamentally 
and primordially, care is not a project that Dasein inevitably takes on 
any more than deathliness is fundamentally and primordially an object 
of cognition. In Heidegger's terms, Dasein is a being that is always con-
cerned about its being; it is always as ex-isting. It is a moving toward its 
own potentiality-for-being (and for nonbeing). Dasein is always ahead 
of itself, so to speakP It is facticity. Ex-isting is a kind of stretching 
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along, never resting in self-identity. It is this moving-ahead-of-itself in 
perpetual non-self-identity that is what Dasein is. 
In this sense, Dasein is care-rather than, say, a subjectivity char-
acterized by care or behaving with care. Dasein as care displaces 
subjectivity as substance with qualities. Dasein is an ever-non-self-
identical ex-isting, "itself" only in ever moving beyond itself. This is 
Heidegger's claim. But more importantly, it is also simultaneously 
Heidegger's practice. In the process and effort of thinking Dasein as 
care, that thinking "itself" undoes itself, becomes nonidentical with it-
self. In this process, Heidegger is caught up in a movement of thinking 
that necessarily alters the thinking he is engaged in and the agent of 
that thinking. Within that movement of thinking, our very Cartesian 
conception of what thinking itself is must give way. For just as being is 
no longer thinkable in terms of objective presence, thinking is no 
longer the activity of subjects. Thus, just as subjects (and objects) are 
not fundamental in Foucault's thinking through the historical consti-
tution of subjectivities, subjects and objects are not fundamental in 
this Heideggerian analysis of human existence, and through the course 
of this movement of thinking, subjects and objects lose their power to 
order our philosophical world. 
Here particularly, in his discussion of care, we see the moving of 
Heidegger's thinking moving ahead of Heidegger's thinking. What he 
thinks is giving way to thinking such that that particular what is jeop-
ardized. The effort to think ex-istence beyond the dictates of the 
Cartesian tradition eventually pushes itself beyond the questions it 
first poses for itself in order to get underway. For in this diminishing 
power of Cartesian subjects and objects, this analytic of Dasein, too, 
gradually loses its power and urgency. As the movement of thinking 
that is the analytic of Dasein does its work, it violates its own inten-
tional ground. Thinking Dasein as care was, for it, a way, a path as 
Poggeler puts it, beyond Dasein. The analytic of Dasein is an incom-
plete project, because it is a project of self-overcoming. Hence, not 
only is Being and Time about Dasein as care, but Heidegger's work in 
Being and Time essentially is care, and it is care that makes the think-
ing of care as conceived in Being and Time inessential. 
. Nevertheless, here Heidegger's work once again appears to be 
very different from Foucault's. The last of Foucault's books to be pub-
lished in his lifetime was Le souci de soi (The care of the self), a book 
about ancient practices of self-improvement or self-cultivation.24 In 
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that text and in numerous interviews and lectures given prior to its 
publication, Foucault discusses various specialized activities that were 
intended as forms of personal, subjective strengthening or discipline.25 
These practices were not ordinary, everyday concernful "taking care 
of things," like Heidegger's descriptions of the on tic expressions of 
Dasein as care. They were askeses, extra-ordinary disciplines that 
people imposed upon themselves to become better-stronger, better 
able to govern, more alert, more in tune with divinity-than they were 
before, activities designed to lift individuals out of average everyday-
ness. Furthermore, Foucault seems favorably disposed toward such 
practices-not the reinstatement of the specific ancient practices that 
he examines but the creative undertaking that such practices repre-
sent.26 And all of this seems utterly opposed to anything Heidegger 
would advocate, judging by passages in Being and Time such as the 
following: "The expression 'care for oneself,' following the analogy of 
taking care and concern, would be a tautology. Care cannot mean a 
special attitude toward the self, because the self is already character-
ized ontologically as being-ahead-of-itself" (B&T, I8o}. What Hei-
degger means by Sorge-an ontological determination of the being of 
Dasein-and what Foucault means by souci-a deliberate practice of 
self-cultivation-seem analytically incompatible. 
Yet I want to argue that while the words are differently employed, 
in fact the philosophical practices that Heidegger and Foucault engage 
in under the rubric of care and especially under the rubric of thinking 
care are closely allied. As I have argued above, Heidegger is involved 
in-caught up in-a self-overcoming movement of thinking that fun-
damentally alters thinking and selves in ways unforeseeable at that 
thinking's outset. His work is a path without a defined, stable, static 
destination. In this respect, what Heidegger does is very similar to 
what Foucault does and advocates doing when he thinks through self-
development and self-constitution in disciplinary practices. As I have 
argued in detail elsewhere, Foucault sees the practice of philosophy 
itself as a discipline that functions-or at least can function-as a 
form of care of the self,27 as he understands that phrase. To make my 
point, it will be necessary to offer a brief discussion of the phenome-
non that he names "normalization" and of care of the self as normal-
ized practice. 
Foucault gives an extensive account of the emergence of normali-
zation in Survei/ler et punir (Discipline and Punish). He asserts there 
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that normalization is a form of disciplinary power that is pervasive in 
present-day society and has been prevalent since the nineteenth cen-
tury.28 Normalizing disciplinary power is a set of organizational forces 
that give shape and meaning to virtually every aspect of the modern 
world. A fundamental rule within normalizing disciplines is the no-
tion that all living things (and many nonliving things and processes) 
are developmental in their very nature, and their development can be 
captured and characterized statistically; it can be "normed." Nowa-
days the technical experts among us norm almost everything-from 
intelligence quotients to weather patterns. And all of us analyze things 
and events and assess them with reference to norms. But norms are 
not taken to be inviolable givens; we know that processes of develop-
ment can be influenced and redirected in various ways, and new norms 
can be created. Normalizing power does not simply determine norms 
and force individuals to approximate them; it is not primarily prohibi-
tive. Rather, normalizing power establishes norms, reformulates entire 
developmental trajectories, and uses the developmental power it dis-
covers in all things as a medium for re-creating the world. 
Foucault's analysis of normalization often presents such networks 
of power and knowledge as frightening, insidious, and overwhelm-
ing. There is no outside to this way of ordering, no counter-order to 
which we could escape. "Power is everywhere"29; "power is 'always 
already there,' ... one is never 'outside' it, ... there are no 'margins' 
for those who break with the system to gambol in."30 Since subjectivi-
ties are formed in history, in networks of power, our very identities are 
based on normalizing power/knowledge networks; those networks 
constitute us and hold us firmly in their grip. But Foucault is no fatal-
ist, despite the bleak picture he paints in Discipline and Punish and 
elsewhere. He is a Nietzschean; he is alert, always, to the movements 
of self-overcoming within all movements, all events and networks of 
power. 
It is this deep and powerful Nietzschean undercurrent in all of 
Foucault's genealogical work that offsets the threat of fatalistic de-
spair. All things change; nothing retains its identity through time. 
"The forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regu-
lative mechanisms, but respond to haphazard conflicts."31 Systems of 
power/knowledge do not simply subsist; to perpetuate themselves they 
must repeat themselves in exercise from moment to moment. And 
thus there is always the possibility that they will alter, fail, or realign 
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themselves-in large ways or in small ones. We may not be able to 
step outside of normalizing power, but normalizing power is, never-
theless, neither monolithic nor eternal. On the contrary, the relations 
that produce and reproduce it at every turn are ultimately unstable 
and changeable. "To say that one can never be 'outside' power does 
not mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat no matter 
what."32 
Nevertheless, to say that systems or networks of power are change-
able is also not to say that those sets of relations are subject to any 
person's control. How conflict or challenges may affect the networks 
is not completely predictable. However, we know from history that in 
some instances at least, human beings have developed ways to alter 
the selves that they have been made to be within the networks of 
power/knowledge that formed them. Precisely this was what Foucault 
was studying when he examined the askesis of the ancients, their 
techne tou biou, in the last two volumes of the History of Sexuality se-
ries, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. These ancient prac-
tices of self-cultivation figured as care demonstrate the possibility that 
human beings can cultivate themselves as forms of subjectivity. They 
show that there exists the possibility of intentional creative change, 
even for what Foucault terms an art of life. 
Within normalizing networks of power, in particular, this pos-
sibility for intentional creativity looms large. Because of the crucial 
role of the phenomenon of development within normalizing power/ 
knowledge networks, those networks are especially susceptible to 
change. Therefore it is possible that we could cultivate selves-types 
or modes of subjectivity-within normalizing networks of power/ 
knowledge in ways that may be self-violating and thus could break 
open a new space for new power/knowledge formations. This is, sure-
ly, Foucault's aim when he undertakes analyses of such means of self-
cultivation from his own position within a normalized society. By 
studying and attempting such practices, we can turn the energy of 
developmental normalization against itself by inciting development 
not along predetermined, normed lines toward a known goal-as dis-
ciplinary power always seeks to do-but along developmental lines 
themselves. We can engage in developmental self-cultivation for its 
own sake, embrace normalization without embracing the drive for ab-
solute control that normalization has embodied. In other words, we 
can honor the path without thought of the destination; we can think 
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and act with movements of self-overcoming in the absence of a static 
objective. This is the direction that Foucault's ethical work in the late 
1970s and 1980s clearly points-the development of development be-
yond the normalized category of development. In short, then, and in 
words other than his own, Foucault's call for care of the self, his call 
to an art of existence, is a call to engage-philosophically, practically, 
bodily-in a rejection of the metaphysics of presence in favor of an 
embodied affirmation of ex-istence.33 
Conclusion 
As I acknowledged at the beginning of this essay, it may very well 
seem upon first reading that Foucault's rejection of subjectivity as a 
primary analytic category and Heidegger's central attention to human 
experience in his phenomenology of Dasein place these two thinkers 
in severe opposition. And it is true that their projects are in some re-
spects fundamentally different from one another. A careful reading of 
both, however, can generate an appreciation for the similarities in 
their critiques of traditional conceptions of subjectivity and, more im-
portantly, in the effects their work can have on our thinking and even 
on our embodied experience of ourselves as subjects. 
Both philosophers' works effect displacements of subjectivity that 
can usher in fundamental transformations in thought and life. For 
Foucault, philosophy is an askesis, an exercise of thinking that moves 
beyond its own ground, that transforms thinking itself.34 For Heidegger, 
too, philosophy is an exercise, a movement of thinking that trans-
forms thinking. Regardless of countless differences in emphasis, vo-
cabulary, approach, and simple temperament, therefore, both men 
practice philosophy as a way, a movement that leaves nothing immune 
from transformation-neither the object of thought, nor thinking's 
subject, nor the traditions of thinking that set up such categories in the 
first place. To think with either philosopher is to abandon oneself to 
movements of self-overcoming that affirm history, passage, and change 
above stasis and essential identity. However different they may be, 
these thinkers' paths converge in the nonplace of difference. 
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